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Privacy-Preserving Ciphertext Multi-Sharing
Control for Big Data Storage
Kaitai Liang, Willy Susilo, Senior Member, IEEE and Joseph K. Liu+
Abstract—The need of secure big data storage service is
more desirable than ever to date. The basic requirement of the
service is to guarantee the confidentiality of the data. However,
the anonymity of the service clients, one of the most essential
aspects of privacy, should be considered at the same time.
Moreover, the service also should provide practical and fine-
grained encrypted data sharing so that a data owner is allowed
to share a ciphertext of data among others based on his/her
wish, under some pre-defined conditions. This paper, for the
first time, proposes a privacy-preserving ciphertext multi-sharing
mechanism to achieve the above properties simultaneously. It
combines the merits of proxy re-encryption with anonymous
technique in which a ciphertext can be securely and conditionally
shared multiple times without leaking both the knowledge of
underlying plaintext and the identity information of ciphertext
senders/recipients. Furthermore, the paper shows that the new
primitive is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks in the
standard model under the Decisional P Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
assumption.
Keywords: Privacy, anonymity, proxy re-encryption, big data.
I. INTRODUCTION
To date many individuals and companies choose to upload
their data to clouds since the clouds are able to support con-
siderable data storage service but also efficient data processing
capability. Accordingly, it is unavoidable that trillion tons
of personal and industrial data are flooded in the Internet.
For example, in some smart grid scenario a governmental
department might choose to supervise the electricity consump-
tion of a local living district. A great amount of electricity
consumed date of each family located inside the district will be
automatically transferred to the department via Internet period
by period. The need of big data storage, therefore, is more
desirable than ever.
A basic security requirement of big data storage is to guar-
antee the confidentiality of the data. Fortunately, some existing
cryptographic encryption mechanisms can be employed to
fulfill the requirement. For instance, Public Key Encryption
(PKE) allows a data sender to encrypts the data under the
public key of receiver such that no one except the valid
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recipient can gain access to the data. Nevertheless, this does
not satisfy all the needs behind the scenario of big data storage.
Consider the following scenario. We suppose a hospital
stores its patients’ medical records in a cloud storage system
and meanwhile, the records are all in the encrypted form
so as to avoid the cloud server from accessing to any plain
medical information. After a medical record is encrypted and
further uploaded to the cloud, only those specified doctors
can gain access to the record. By using some traditional
PKE, Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), or Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE), the confidentiality of the record can be
protected effectively.
By trivially employing traditional encryption mechanisms,
nevertheless, we cannot prevent some sensitive medical in-
formation from being leaked to the cloud server but also the
public. This is so because traditional encryption systems do
not consider the anonymity of a ciphertext sender/receiver. Ac-
cordingly, someone, could be anyone with capability to access
the ciphertext of the record, may know whose public key the
ciphertext is encrypted under, namely who is the owner of the
ciphertext, so that the patient associated with the ciphertext
can be easily identified. Similarly, the recipient/destination of
the ciphertext, e.g., Cardiology Dept., can be known from
the ciphertext without any difficulty as well. This seriously
disgraces the privacy of the patient.
Moreover, a patient might be transferred to different medical
departments in his/her treatment phase. The corresponding
medical record then needs to be converted to the ciphertexts
corresponding to various receivers so as to be shared among
the departments. Therefore, the update of ciphertext recipient
is desirable. Precisely speaking, a fine-grained ciphertext up-
date for receivers is necessary in the sense that a ciphertext
could be conditionally shared with others. The medical record
owner, i.e. the patient, has rights to decide who can gain access
to his/her record, and which kinds of data could be accessed.
For example, the patient can choose to specify that only the
medical record described with “teeth” can be read by a dentist.
This fine-grained control avoids a data sharing mechanism
from being limited to the “all-or-nothing” share mode.
This work is trying to solve the above problems. To preserve
anonymity, some well-known encryption mechanisms are pro-
posed in the literature, such as anonymous IBE [8], anonymous
ABE [40]. By employing these primitives, the source and
the destination of data can be protected privately. But the
primitives cannot support the update of ciphertext receiver.
There are some naive approaches to update ciphertext’s re-
cipient. For instance, data owner can employ the decrypt-then-
re-encrypt mode. However, this is applicable to the scenario
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where there is only a small amount of data. If the encrypted
data is either a group of sequences of gene information or a
network audit log, the decryption and re-encryption might be
time consumed and computation costly. Moreover, this mode
also suffers from a limitation that the data owner has to be on-
line all the time. Alternatively, a fully trusted third party with
knowledge of the decryption key of the data owner may be
delegated to handle the task. Nevertheless, this strongly relies
on the trust of the party. Besides, the anonymity of the receiver
cannot be achieved as the party needs to know the information
of recipient to proceed the re-encryption. Therefore, both of
the approaches do not scale well.
Introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [27] and first defined
in [5], Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is proposed to tackle the
dilemma of data sharing. It allows a semi-trusted party called
proxy to transform a ciphertext intended for a user into a
ciphertext of the same plaintext intended for another user
without leaking knowledge of either the decryption keys or
the plaintext. The workload of data owner is transferred to
the proxy, and the “on-line all the time” requirement for the
owner is unnecessary.
This work focuses on the identity-based cryptographic set-
ting. To employ PRE in the IBE setting, [17] defined the
notion of Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (IBPRE), which
offers a practical solution for access control in networked
file storage [17], and secure email with IBE [17]. To capture
privacy-preserving property and ciphertext’s recipient update
simultaneously, [31] proposed an anonymous IBPRE system,
which is CCA security in the random oracle model.
This valuable research work introduces the first anony-
mous IBPRE in the literature and meanwhile, it leaves us
interesting and meaningful open problems. The work only
supports one-time ciphertext receiver update, while multiple
receivers update is desirable in practice. On the other hand,
the work provides an “all-or-nothing” share mode that limits
the flexibility of data sharing.
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, we are trying to propose a ciphertext sharing
mechanism with the following properties:
• Anonymity: given a ciphertext, no one knows the corre-
sponding sender and receiver.
• Multiple receiver-update: given a ciphertext, the receiver
of the ciphertext can be updated in multiple times. In this
paper, we refer to this property as “multi-hop”.
• Conditional sharing: a ciphertext can be fine-grained
shared with others if the pre-specified conditions are
satisfied.
Achievements. We investigate a new notion, AMH-
IBCPRE. We formalize the definition and security model by
incorporating the definitions in [32], [33]. In the security
model, we allow the corrupted users to be adaptively chosen
by an adversary, while the adversary must output the challenge
identity at the outset of security game. Moreover, we define
four security models for different purposes. They are briefly
described as follows:
• The security model of MH-IBCPRE is the basic model,
in which a challenger plays the game with the adversary
to launch CCA to the original ciphertext and re-encrypted
ciphertext in order to solve a hard problem.
• We also consider the case where a proxy colludes with
delegatee to compromise the underlying plaintext and
the secret key of delegator. Here, the protection of the
plaintext is difficult to achieve as the delegatee can
decrypt the corresponding ciphertext. The secret key of
the delegator, however, is possible to be secured.
• For the definition of collusion attacks model, we allow
the adversary to acquire all re-encryption keys and the
adversary wins the game if it outputs a valid secret key
of an uncorrupted user. We note that our definition is in
a selective model in which the adversary has to output a
target identity at the outset of the security game.
• As to the security model of anonymity, it is more compli-
cated in the sense that we categorize the game into two
sub-games: one is the anonymity for the delegator (i.e.
given the original ciphertext the adversary cannot output
identity of the delegator), the other is the anonymity of the
re-encryption key (i.e. the adversary cannot distinguish a
valid re-encryption key from a random one belonging to
the re-encryption key space).
We next propose a concrete construction for unidirectional
AMH-IBCPRE, in which it achieves multiple ciphertext
receiver update, conditional data sharing, anonymity and
collusion-safe (i.e. holding against collusion attacks) simul-
taneously in the asymmetric bilinear map setting. Note the
functionality of our system is generally described in Fig 1.
We state that our new primitive is applicable to many real-
world applications, such as secure email forwarding, electronic
encrypted data sharing, where both anonymity and flexible
encrypted conversion are needed. We also show our scheme
is CCA-secure in the standard model under the decisional
P -Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. To the best of our
knowledge, our AMH-IBCPRE is the first of its kind in the
literature.
B. Related Work
Following the concept of delegation of decryption rights
introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [27], Blaze et al. [5]
formalized the concept of proxy re-encryption and proposed
a seminal bidirectional PRE scheme. Afterwards, many PRE
schemes have been proposed, such as [2], [3], [11], [18], [25],
[20], [23], [26], [21].
Employing traditional PRE in the IBE setting, Green and
Ateniese [17] first defined the notion of IBPRE and proposed
two unidirectional IBPRE schemes in the random oracle
model: one is CPA secure and the other holds against CCA.
Later, two CPA-secure IBE-PRE schemes (in the types of
PKE-IBE and IBE-IBE) [28] have been proposed. In 2008,
Tang et al. [35] proposed an IBPRE scheme with CPA security
in the random oracle model, in which the delegator and the del-
egatee can come from different domains. Afterwards, Wang et
al. proposed two IBPRE schemes that are both collusion-safe
and non-transferable in the random oracle model. However,
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Fig. 1: Anonymous Multi-Hop Identity-Based Conditional Proxy Re-Encryption
the generation of re-encryption key requires the participation
of the PKG. With the same technique, a CPA-secure IBPRE
scheme (in the type of IBE-PKE) without random oracles was
proposed by Minzuno and Doi [29]. Recently, an IBPRE with
revocability and hierarchical confidentialities was proposed by
Wang et al. [37]. Despite the scheme combines the IBPRE
with proxy decryption, it still requires an interaction for re-
encryption key generation.
In the multiple ciphertext receiver update1 scenario, Green
and Ateniese [17] proposed the first MH-IBPRE scheme which
is CPA secure in 2007. Later, a RCCA-secure MH-IBPRE
scheme without random oracles was proposed by Chu and
Tzeng [12]. In 2010, Wang et al. [36] proposed the first CCA-
secure MH-IBPRE with random oracles. These three schemes,
however, are not collusion-safe. To solve the problem, Shao
and Cao [32] proposed the first CCA-secure MH-IBPRE in
the standard model with collusion-safe property.
To preserve the anonymity, the following cryptosystems are
proposed in the literature. To hide the information revealed by
the re-encryption key, Ateniese et al. [1] first define the notion
of key-privacy (i.e. an adversary cannot identify delegator
and delegatee even given re-encryption key) and proposed
a CPA-secure scheme in the standard model. Later, Shao et
al. [34] revised the security model of key privacy defined
in [1] and proposed a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme
with CCA security in the standard model. To prevent from
being traceable, Emura et al. [15] proposed a unidirectional
IBPRE scheme for multi-hop setting, in which an adversary
cannot identify the source from the destination ciphertext.
The scheme is proven to be CCA secure in the random
oracle model. To protect the privacy of both delegator and
delegatee, Shao et al. [33] proposed the first Anonymous PRE
(ANO-PRE) scheme which is CCA secure with collusion-
safe in the random oracle model. The scheme ensures that
an adversary cannot identify the recipient of original and re-
encrypted ciphertext even given the re-encryption key. In 2012,
Shao [31] also proposed the first anonymous IBPRE with CCA
security in the random oracle model.
In the identity-based and attribute-based encryption settings,
some well-known systems supporting anonymity that have
been proposed, such as [8], [9], [19], [9], [16], [40], [30].
1Note we refer to multiple ciphertext receiver update to a property called
Multi-Hop (MH) in this paper.
However, we will focus on the combination of anonymity and
ciphertext update properties. Therefore, the aforementioned
systems will not be taken in comparison below.
Below we compare our work with the some related research
works, and summarize the comparison of properties in Table I.
While multiple ciphertext receiver update (denoting as M.U.),
conditional share, collusion resistance (denoting as C.R.),
anonymity, and without random oracle (denoting as W.R.O.),
have all five been partially achieved by previous schemes, there
is no efficient CCA-secure proposal that achieves all properties
simultaneously in the standard model. This paper, for the first
time, fills the gap.
TABLE I: Property Comparison
Sch. Security W.R.O. M.U. C.R. Conditional Anonymity
Share
[17] CPA # ! # # #
[12] RCCA ! ! # # #
[32] CCA ! ! ! # #
[31] CCA # # ! # !
Ours CCA ! ! ! ! !
II. DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODELS
A. Definition for Multi-Hop Identity-Based Conditional Proxy
Re-Encryption
Definition 1: A unidirectional Multi-Hop Identity-Based
Conditional Proxy Re-Encryption (MH-IBCPRE) scheme con-
sists of the following algorithms:
1) (mpk,msk)← Setup(1k): on input a security parameter
k, output a master public key mpk and a master secret
key msk. For simplicity, we omit mpk in the expression
of the following algorithms.
2) skID ← KeyGen(msk, ID): on input msk, and an
identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, output a secret key skID.
3) rkw,IDi→IDi′ ← ReKeyGen(IDi, skIDi , IDi′ , w): on
input a delegator’s identity IDi and the correspond-
ing secret key skIDi , a delegatee’s identity IDi′ , and
a condition w ∈ {0, 1}∗, output a re-encryption key
rkw,IDi→IDi′ from IDi to IDi′ under condition w.
4) C1,IDi,w ← Enc(IDi, w,m): on input an identity IDi, a
condition w and a message m, output a 1-level ciphertext
C1,IDi,w under identity IDi.
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5) Cl+1,IDi′ ,w ← ReEnc(rkw,IDi→IDi′ , w, Cl,IDi,w): on
input rkw,IDi→IDi′ , a condition w and an l-level cipher-
text Cl,IDi,w under identity IDi and w, output an (l+1)-
level ciphertext Cl+1,IDi′ ,w under identity IDi′ and w or
⊥ for failure, where l ≥ 1, l ∈ N.
6) m ← Dec(skIDi , w, Cl,IDi,w): on input skIDi , w and
an l-level ciphertext Cl,IDi,w under identity IDi and w,
output a message m or ⊥ for failure, where l ≥ 1, l ∈ N.
Correctness: For any k, l ∈ N, any identities IDi, IDi′ ∈
{0, 1}∗, i ∈ {1, ..., l}, any condition w ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
any message m ∈ {0, 1}k, if (mpk,msk) ← Setup(1k),
skID ← KeyGen(msk, ID), for all ID used in the system,
rkw,IDi→IDi′ ← ReKeyGen(IDi, skIDi , IDi′ , w), we have
Dec(skID1 , w, C1,ID1,w) = m;
Dec(skIDi , w,ReEnc(rkw,IDi−1→IDi , w,
ReEnc(rkw,IDi−2→IDi−1 , w, ...,
ReEnc(rkw,ID1→ID2 , w,Enc(ID1, w,m))))...) = m.
B. Security Models
We define four security models in terms of the selective
condition and selective identity chosen ciphertext security
(IND-sCon-sID-CCA), collusion resistance, the anonymity of
the original ciphertext and anonymity of the re-encryption key
in this section. Before proceeding, we define some notations
used in the following definition.
Notations.
• Delegation Chain. There is a set of re-encryption
keys RK = {rkw,IDi1→IDi2 , ..., rkw,IDil−1→IDil } un-
der the same condition w, for any re-encryption key
rkw,IDij→IDij+1 in RK, IDij 6= IDij+1 . We say that
there exists a delegation chain under w from identity IDi1
to identity IDil , denoted as w|IDi1 → ...→ IDil . Note
this delegation chain includes the case where IDi1 =
IDil . Besides, we can use w|ID to indicate a ciphertext
under w and ID, and for a single identity ID we can
use ⊥ |ID to denote it.
• Uncorrupted/Corrupted Identity. If the secret key of
an identity is compromised by an adversary, the identity
is a corrupted identity. Otherwise, it is an uncorrupted
identity.
• Uncorrupted Delegation Chain. Suppose there is a
delegation chain under w from IDi to IDj (i.e. w|IDi →
...→ IDj). If there is no corrupted identity in the chain,
it is an uncorrupted delegation chain. Otherwise, it is a
corrupted one.
Definition 2: A unidirectional MH-IBCPRE scheme is
IND-sCon-sID-CCA-secure if no PPT adversary A can win
the game below with non-negligible advantage. In the game,
B is the game challenger and k is the security parameter.
1) Init. A outputs a challenge identity ID∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
a challenge condition w ∈ {0, 1}∗.
2) Setup. B runs setup(1k) and returns mpk to A.
3) Phase 1. A is given access to the following oracles.
a) Osk(ID): given an identity ID, output skID ←
KeyGen(msk, ID).
b) Ork(IDi, IDi′ , w): on input two distinct iden-
tities IDi and IDi′ , and a condition w, output
rkw,IDi→IDi′ ← ReKeyGen(IDi, skIDi , IDi′ , w),
where skIDi ← KeyGen(msk, IDi).
c) Ore(IDi, IDi′ , w, Cl,IDi,w): on input two distinct
identities IDi and IDi′ , a condition w, and an l-
level ciphertext Cl,IDi,w under IDi and w, output
Cl+1,IDi,w ← ReEnc(rkw,IDi→IDi′ , w, Cl,IDi,w),
where rkw,IDi→IDi′ ← ReKeyGen(IDi, skIDi ,
IDi′ , w), skIDi ← KeyGen(msk, IDi).
d) Odec(IDi, w, Cl,IDi,w): on input an identity IDi, a
condition w, and an l-level ciphertext Cl,IDi,w, out-
put m ← Dec(skIDi , w, Cl,IDi,w), where skIDi ←
KeyGen(msk, IDi).
In this phase the followings are forbidden to issue:
• Osk(ID) for any ID, if there is an uncorrupted
delegation chain under w∗ from ID∗ to ID, or
ID∗ = ID.
• Ork(IDi, IDi′ , w∗) for any IDi, IDi′ , if there is an
uncorrupted delegation chain under w∗ from ID∗
to IDi or ID∗ = IDi, but IDi′ is in a corrupted
delegation chain.
4) Challenge.A outputs two equal length messages m0, m1,
and a set of identities {IDij}
j=l∗−1
j=1 to B. B computes
Cl∗,ID∗,w∗ as
ReEnc(ReKeyGen(IDil∗−1 , skIDil∗−1 , ID
∗, w∗),
ReEnc(ReKeyGen(IDil∗−2 , skIDil∗−2 , IDil∗−1 , w
∗),
..., ReEnc(ReKeyGen(IDi1 , skIDi1 , IDi2 , w
∗),
Enc(IDi1 , w
∗,mb)))),
where l∗ ≥ 2, l∗ ∈ N, b ∈R {0, 1}. Note that we here
put ID∗ to the l∗ level of the ciphertext. This shows no
difference from putting it in the first level of the ciphertext
since the system supports multi-hop property.
5) Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1 except the followings:
a) Ore(IDi, IDi′ , w∗, Cl,IDi,w∗): if (IDi, Cl,IDi,w∗) is
a derivative of (ID∗, Cl∗,ID∗,w∗), and IDi′ is in a
corrupted delegation chain. As of [11], a derivative of
(ID∗, Cl∗,ID∗,w∗) is defined as follows.
i. (ID∗, Cl∗,ID∗,w∗) is a derivative of itself.
ii. If (IDi, Cl,IDi,w∗) is a derivative of
(ID∗, Cl∗,ID∗,w∗), and (IDi′ , Cl′,IDi′ ,w∗)
is a derivative of (IDi, Cl,IDi,w∗), then
(IDi′ , Cl′,IDi′ ,w∗) is a derivative of
(ID∗, Cl∗,ID∗,w∗), where l′ ≥ l ≥ l∗.
iii. If A has issued a re-encryption key query to
Ork on (IDi, IDi′ , w) to obtain the re-encryption
key rkw,IDi→IDi′ , and achieved C(l+1,IDi′ ,w) ←
ReEnc(rkw,IDi→IDi′ , w, C(l,IDi,w)), then (IDi′ ,
C(l+1,IDi′ ,w)) is a derivative of (IDi, C(l,IDi,w)).
iv. If A can execute C(l+1,IDi′ ,w) ←
ReEnc(ReKeyGen(IDi, skIDi , IDi′ , w), w,
C(l,IDi,w)) on its own, then (IDi′ , C(l+1,IDi′ ,w))
is a derivative of (IDi, C(l,IDi,w)), where
skIDi← KeyGen(msk, IDi).
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v. If A has issued a re-encryption query on
(IDi, IDi′ , w, C(l,IDi,w)) and obtained
C(l+1,IDi′ ,w), then (IDi′ , C(l+1,IDi′ ,w)) is
a derivative of (IDi, C(l,IDi,w)).
b) Odec(IDi, w∗, Cl,IDi,w∗): if (IDi, Cl,IDi,w∗) is a
derivative of (ID∗, Cl∗,ID∗,w∗).
6) Guess. A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b, A wins.
The advantage of A is defined as ε =
AdvIND-sCon-sID-CCAMH-IBCPRE,A (1
k) = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
We now proceed to collusion resistance. This property
guarantees that an adversary cannot compromise the entire
secret key of a delegator even if it colludes with the delegatee.
Definition 3: A unidirectional MH-IBCPRE scheme holds
against selective collusion attacks if the advantage AdvCRA (1
k)
is negligible for any PPT adversary A in the following
experiment. Set O1 = {Osk, Ork} and AdvCRA (1k) as
Pr[skID∗ ∈ Ω : (ID∗, State)← A(1k);
(mpk,msk)← Setup(1k); skID∗ ← AO1(mpk, State)]
where k is the security parameter, State is the state informa-
tion, ID∗ is the target and uncorrupted identity, Osk and Ork
are the oracles defined in Definition 2, Ω is the valid secret
key space, and skID∗ is the valid secret key of ID∗. If A
issues ID∗ to Osk, output ⊥.
Below we define the anonymity of the original ciphertext
(ANO-OC) for MH-IBCPRE, that is, given the original cipher-
text, an adversary cannot tell the identity of delegator.
Definition 4: A unidirectional MH-IBCPRE scheme
achieves ANO-OC if the advantage AdvANO-OCA (1
k) is
negligible for any PPT adversary A in the following
experiment. Set O2 = {Osk, Ork, Ore, Odec}, and
AdvANO-OCA (1
k) as
|Pr[b = b′ : (w∗, ID∗0 , ID∗1 , State1)← A(1k); (mpk,
msk)← Setup(1k); (m,State2)← AO2(mpk, State1);
b ∈R {0, 1};C1,ID∗b ,w∗ ← Enc(ID
∗
b , w
∗,m);
b′ ← AO2(C1,ID∗b ,w∗ , State2); ]−
1
2
|,
where k is the security parameter, State1, State2 are the state
information, ID∗0 , ID
∗
1 are two distinct uncorrupted identities,
C1,ID∗b ,w∗ is constructed by the game challenger, Osk, Ork,
Ore, Odec are the oracles with the following constraints. In
Osk, the oracle outputs ⊥ if there is an uncorrupted delegation
chain under w∗ from ID∗b to ID or ID
∗
b = ID. In Ork, the
oracle outputs ⊥ if there is an uncorrupted delegation chain
under w∗ from ID∗b to IDi or ID
∗
b = IDi, and IDi′ is in a
corrupted delegation chain. For Ore, if the issued ciphertext is
a derivative of (ID∗b , C1,ID∗b ,w∗), and IDi′ is in a corrupted
delegation chain, output ⊥. For Odec, if the issued ciphertext
is a derivative of (ID∗b , C1,ID∗b ,w∗), output ⊥.
Finally, we define the anonymity of the re-encryption key
(ANO-RK), in which an adversary cannot distinguish a real
re-encryption key from a random one.
Definition 5: A unidirectional MH-IBCPRE scheme
achieves ANO-RK if no PPT adversary A can win the game
below with non-negligible advantage.
1) Init. A outputs a delegator’s identity ID′, a challenge
delegatee’s identity ID∗, and a challenge condition w∗.
2) Setup. Same as Definition 2.
3) Phase 1. A is allowed to issue queries to Osk,Ork, Ore
and Odec which are the oracles defined Definition 2 with
the same restrictions.
4) Challenge. If the following queries
• Osk(IDi) for any IDi, if there is an uncorrupted
delegation chain under w∗ from ID∗ to IDi, or
ID∗ = IDi.
• Ork(IDi, IDj , w∗) for any IDi, IDj , if there is an
uncorrupted delegation chain under w∗ from ID∗
to IDi or ID∗ = IDi, but IDj is in a corrupted
delegation chain.
are never made, B flips a coin-toss for b ∈ {0, 1}. Then B
sets the re-encryption key rkw∗,ID′→ID∗ as a random key
from the re-encryption key space if b = 0 and computes
rkw∗,ID′→ID∗ ← ReKeyGen(ID′, skID′ , ID∗, w∗)
otherwise. Finally, B outputs rkw∗,ID′→ID∗ to A.
5) Phase 2. Same as Phase 1 except the followings:
a) Osk(IDi) for any IDi, if there is an uncorrupted
delegation chain under w∗ from ID∗ to IDi, or
ID∗ = IDi;
b) Ork(IDi, IDj , w∗) for any IDi, IDj , if there is an
uncorrupted delegation chain under w∗ from ID∗ to
IDi or ID∗ = IDi, but IDj is in a corrupted
delegation chain;
c) Ore(IDi, IDi′ , w∗, Cl,IDi,w∗): if (IDi, Cl,IDi,w∗) is a
(derivative of) ciphertext generated by a re-encryption
key in the delegation chain under w∗ from ID∗ to IDi,
and IDi′ is in a corrupted delegation chain; and
d) Odec(IDi, w∗, Cl,IDi,w∗): if (IDi, Cl,IDi,w∗) is a
(derivative of) ciphertext generated by a re-encryption
key in the delegation chain under w∗ from ID∗ to IDi.
6) Guess. A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b, A wins.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvANO-RKA (1k) =
|Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
Remark. As sated in [1], the anonymity of the re-encrypted
ciphertext is implied by the anonymity of the re-encryption
key, we hence omit the details here. We refer the reader to [1]
for more details.
III. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS AND BUILDING BLOCKS
A. Asymmetric Pairings
Let BSetup be an algorithm that on input the security
parameter k, outputs the parameters of a bilinear map as
(q, g, ĝ,G1,G2,GT , e), where G1, G2 and GT are multiplica-
tive cyclic groups of prime order q, where |q| = k, and g is
a random generator of G1, ĝ is a random generator of G2.
The mapping e : G1 × G2 → GT has three properties: (1)
Bilinearity: for all a, b ∈R Z∗q , e(ga, ĝb) = e(g, ĝ)ab; (2) Non-
degeneracy: e(g, ĝ) 6= 1GT , where 1GT is the unit of GT ; (3)
Computability: e can be efficiently computed. Note that G1
and G2 are not the same.
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B. Complexity Assumptions
Asymmetric Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (ABDH) Prob-
lem [14]. Given a tuple (g, ga, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb)∈ G31 ×G32, com-
pute e(g, ĝ)abc ∈ GT .
Asymmetric Decisional BDH (ADBDH) Problem [14].
Given a tuple (g, ga, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb)∈ G31 × G32 and T ∈ GT ,
decide whether T = e(g, ĝ)abc.
(Asymmetric) Decisional P-BDH Problem [14]. Given a
tuple (g, ga, gab, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb)∈ G41 ×G32 and T ∈ GT , decide
whether T = e(g, ĝ)abc.
Definition 6: ADBDH Assumption [14]. We say
that an algorithm A has advantage AdvADBDHA = ε
in solving the ADBDH problem in (G1,G2)
if |Pr[A(g, ga, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb, e(g, ĝ)abc) = 0] −
Pr[A(g, ga, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb, T ) = 0]| ≥ ε, where the probability
is over the random choice of generators g ∈ G1 and ĝ ∈ G2,
the random choice of exponents a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , T ∈ GT , and the
random bits used by A. We say that the ADBDH assumption
holds in (G1,G2) if no PPT algorithm has advantage ε in
solving the ASBDH problem in (G1,G2).
Definition 7: (Asymmetric) Decisional P-BDH Assump-
tion [14]. We say that an algorithm A has advantage
AdvP-BDHA = ε in solving the decisional P-BDH problem
in (G1,G2) if |Pr[A(g, ga, gab, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb, gabc) = 0] −
Pr[A(g, ga, gab, gc, ĝ, ĝa, ĝb, T ) = 0]| ≥ ε, where the prob-
ability is over the random choice of generators g ∈ G1 and
ĝ ∈ G2, the random choice of exponents a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , T ∈ G1,
and the random bits used by A. We say that the decisional
P-BDH assumption holds in (G1,G2) if no PPT algorithm
has advantage ε in solving the decisional P-BDH problem in
(G1,G2).
C. Strongly Existential Unforgeable One-Time Signatures.
A strongly existential unforgeable (sUF) one-time signa-
ture [4] consists of the following algorithms:
1) (Ks,Kv)← Sig.KG(1k): on input a security parameter
k ∈ N, the algorithm outputs a signing/ verification key
pair (Ks,Kv).
2) σ ← Sign(Ks,M): on input the signing key Ks and a
message M ∈ ΓSig, the algorithm outputs a signature σ,
where ΓSig is the message space of a signature scheme.
3) 1/0← V er(Kv, σ,M): on input the verification key Kv ,
a signature σ and a message M , the algorithm outputs 1
when σ is a valid signature of M , and output 0 otherwise.
Definition 8: A signature scheme is one-time strongly un-
forgeable chosen-message attack (sUF-CMA) secure if the ad-
vantage AdvsUF -CMAA (1
k) is negligible for any PPT adversary
A in the following experiment.
AdvsUF -CMAA (1
λ) = Pr[V er(Kv, σ
∗,M∗) = 1 :
(Ks,Kv)← Sig.KG(1k); (M,State)← A(Kv);
σ ← Sign(Ks,M); (M∗, σ∗)← A(Kv, σ, State);
(M∗, σ∗) 6= (M,σ)],
where State is the state information.
D. One-time Symmetric Encryption
A one-time symmetric encryption [13] consists of the
following algorithms. Note let KD be the key space
{0, 1}poly(1k), and SYM be a symmetric encryption scheme,
where poly(1k) is the fixed polynomial size (bound) with
respect to the security parameter k. The encryption algorithm
SYM.Enc intakes a key K ∈ KD and a message M , outputs
a ciphertext C. The decryption algorithm SYM.Dec intakes
K and C, outputs M or a symbol ⊥.
E. Target Collision Resistant Hash Function.
Target Collision Resistant (TCR) hash function was intro-
duced by Cramer and Shoup [13]. A TCR hash function H
guarantees that given a random element x which is from the
valid domain of H , a PPT adversary A cannot find y 6= x
such that H(x) = H(y). We let AdvTCRH,A = Pr[H(x) =
H(y) ∧ x 6= y|x, y ∈ DH] be the advantage of A in
successfully finding collisions from a TCR hash function H ,
where DH is the valid input domain of H . If a hash function
is chosen from a TCR hash function family, AdvTCRH,A is
negligible.
F. An Anonymous IBE and Its Extensions
Ducas [14] introduces an efficient anonymous IBE (Du-
ANO-IBE) scheme in the standard model. We review its
construction below, and omit the definition and security model
of Du-ANO-IBE as the details can be found in [14].
• Setup(1k) : run (q, g, ĝ,G1,G2,GT , e)← BSetup(1k),
choose random values α, β, γ, δ, η ∈ Z∗q , and set g1 = gα,
g2 = g
β , h = gγ , f = gδ , t = gη , ĝ1 = ĝα, ĝ2 =
ĝβ , ĥ = ĝγ , f̂ = ĝδ , t̂ = ĝη . The master secret key
msk = (ĝ0 = ĝ
αβ , f̂ , t̂), the master public key mpk =
(g, ĝ, g1, h, f, t, ĝ2, ĥ).
• Extract(msk, ID) : given msk and an identity ID ∈
Z∗q , randomly choose r,R ∈ Z∗q , output skID =
(skID0 , skID1 , skID2) = (ĝ0(ĥ
IDf̂)r t̂R, ĝr, ĝR).
• Enc(mpk, ID,m) : randomly choose s ∈ Z∗q , compute
C1 = e(g1, ĝ2)
s ·m, C2 = gs, C3 = (hIDf)s, C4 = ts,
and output the ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4), where
ID ∈ Z∗q , m ∈ GT .
• Dec(skID, C) : given a ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4),
using the private key skID to recover the plaintext m =
C1 · e(C3, skID1) · e(C4, skID2)/e(C2, skID0).
By Theorem 1 and its corresponding security proof in [14],
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Du-ANO-IBE is selective-ID (sID) anonymous
and secure against chosen-plaintext attacks assuming the de-
cisional P-BDH assumption holds.
Below we employ the BB1 HIBE technique [6] to extend
Du-ANO-IBE to be a two levels encryption scheme without
losing CPA security, where the first level is the identity, and
the second level is the condition. We state that the first level
is anonymous, but the second level is not.
• Setup(1k): let w ∈ Z∗q be a condition, and choose α, β,
γ, δ1, δ2, η ∈R Z∗q , and set g1 = gα, g2 = gβ , h = gγ ,
f1 = g
δ1 , f2 = gδ2 , t = gη , ĝ1 = ĝα, ĝ2 = ĝβ , ĥ = ĝγ ,
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f̂1 = ĝ
δ1 , f̂2 = ĝδ2 , t̂ = ĝη . The master secret key
msk = (ĝ0 = ĝ
αβ , f̂1, t̂), the master public key mpk =
(g, ĝ, g1, h, f1, f2, t, ĝ2, f̂2, ĥ).
• Extract(msk, ID): set skID = (skID0 , skID1 , skID2 ,
skID3) = (ĝ0(ĥ
IDf̂1)
r1(ĥwf̂2)
r2 t̂R, ĝr1 , ĝr2 , ĝR), where
r1, r2, R ∈ Z∗q . Given skID = (skID0 , skID1 , skID2)
which is generated in the algorithm Extract of Du-
ANO-IBE, one can easily derive the above secret key
by using the BB1 construction technique. To achieve the
consistency of algorithm description, we here use the
“same” secret key generation expression.
• Enc(mpk, ID,m,w): set C1 = e(g1, ĝ2)s ·m, C2 = gs,
C3 = (h
IDf1)
s, C4 = ts and C5 = (hwf2)s, where
s ∈ Z∗q .
• Dec(skID, C): compute m = C1 · e(C3, skID1) ·
e(C5, skID2) · e(C4, skID3)/e(C2, skID0).
We refer to the above system as 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE.
As stated in [14], Du-ANO-IBE can be extended to 2-level
system to achieve CCA security via BB1 HIBE construction
technique. The above system is exactly the converted 2-level
system except that the second level is a condition instead
of a verification key (of a one-time signature). Here the
CPA security of 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE still relies on the
decisional P-BDH assumption, and the corresponding proof is
straightforward to reuse the proof technique presented in [14].
Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE is anonymous and CPA
secure assuming the decisional P-BDH assumption holds.
G. A CCA-Secure 3-Level Du-ANO-HIBE
Here we convert 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE to achieve CCA
security by using the CHK transformation [10]. Following
the BB1 HIBE construction, a 3-level CCA-secure anonymous
system, which is anonymous relative to the first level but not
the second and third levels, can be built as follows.
• Setup(1k) : same as the algorithm Setup of 2-level Du-
ANO-HIBE except the followings. Choose random values
δ3 ∈ Z∗q , and set f3 = gδ3 and f̂3 = ĝδ3 . Choose an sUF
one-time signature scheme (Sig.KG, Sign, V er) and set
the verification key Kv is in Z∗q , where k1 is the security
parameter. The master public key mpk = (g, ĝ, g1, h,
f1, f2, f3, t, ĝ2, f̂2, f̂3, ĥ, (Sig.KG, Sign, V er)).
• Extract(msk, ID) : set skID = (skID0 , skID1 , skID2 ,
skID3 , skID4) = (ĝ0(ĥ
IDf̂1)
r1(ĥwf̂2)
r2(ĥKv f̂3)
r3 t̂R,
ĝr1 , ĝr2 , ĝr3 , ĝR), where r1, r2, r3, R ∈ Z∗q . To
achieve consistency of description, we keep the secret key
generation in one algorithm. Actually, given the secret
key of 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE, one can easily derive the
above key.
• Enc(mpk, ID,m,Kv) : choose s ∈R Z∗q and a one-time
signature key pair (Ks,Kv) ← Sig.KG(1k), set C0 =
Kv , C1 = e(g1, ĝ2)s ·m, C2 = gs, C3 = (hIDf1)s, C4 =
ts, C5 = (hwf2)s, C6 = (hKvf3)s, C7 = Sign(Ks, (C1,
C2, C3, C4, C5, C6)).
• Dec(skID, C) : given a ciphertext C = (C0, C1, C2,
C3, C4, C5, C6, C7), first verify whether e(ĥKv f̂3,
C2) = e(ĝ, C6) and V er(Kv , C7, (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5,
C6)) = 1 hold. If the equations do not hold, output ⊥.
Otherwise, compute m = C1·e(C3, skID1)·e(C5, skID2)·
e(C6, skID3) · e(C4, skID4)/e(C2, skID0).
We refer to the above system as 3-level Du-ANO-HIBE.
By Theorem 2 and the security argument in [14], we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 3: If 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE is sID anonymous
and CPA secure, and (Sig.KG, Sign, V er) is an sUF one-
time signature scheme, 3-level Du-ANO-HIBE is sID anony-
mous and CCA secure.
The security proof is straight forward to reuse the technique
proposed in [14].
IV. A NEW AMH-IBCPRE SCHEME
We first show the difficulties of our construction, and next
present the technical roadmap.
Difficulties in converting existing primitives to achieve
our goals. [31] proposed an IBPRE system with the anonymity
property. Nonetheless, the system cannot be trivially extended
to satisfy the conditional sharing and multiple receivers update.
This is because the construction of re-encryption key and
re-encrypted ciphertext both limit its extension. In the re-
encryption key generation, there is no interface for a condition,
unless we bond the condition with the identity and further re-
gard them as a whole “identity”. But this hinders the flexibility
of the system as for each distinct condition, the private key
generator has to generate a private key for user accordingly.
The number of private key now increases to O(ab), where a
is the maximum number of condition belonging to a user, and
b is the number of system user.
In the re-encryption, the original ciphertext component c1
and c2 are necessary components. Only c2 but not c1 is
included in re-encrypted ciphertext. This explains why a re-
encrypted ciphertext holder cannot make a further conversion.
If we want to extend the ciphertext to support multiple re-
encryption, we have to keep both components simultaneously.
However, this will make the system insecure in the security
of re-encrypted ciphertext as an adversary can leverage them
and a re-encryption key from the challenge identity to a
corrupted user to re-encrypt the challenge ciphertext to one
whose plaintext can be recovered.
In addition to [31], we observe that [32], [24], [22] also
proposed useful IBPRE systems, which partially achieve our
goals. Nevertheless, none of these systems can be extended
to support anonymity. This is because they are built based on
non-anonymous IBE systems [39], [7] and [38], respectively.
In a non-anonymous IBE, the identity information can be
easily checked by pairings computation. Note we here refer
reader to [38] for more details.
To achieve all our goals at the same time, we follow
the technical roadmap below. We first start with an anony-
mous IBE [14], and next extend the IBE system to become
anonymous 3 levels hierarchical IBE with CCA security by
leveraging CHK transformation [10], in which one level is
for identity, one is for condition and the rest is for ver-
ification key. Based on the resulting system, we build an
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anonymous multi-hop identity-based conditional proxy re-
encryption (AMH-IBCPRE) scheme. In the scheme, we lever-
age the private key derivation property of hierarchical IBE
to construct a re-encryption key such that the re-encryption
key contains a masked “secret key” for identity vector
(identity, condition). We state that even an adversary obtains
this so-called secret key it can only achieve the re-encryption
but not decryption rights of the ciphertexts corresponding
to (identity, condition). For the re-encryption, we utilize
a one-time symmetric key encryption technique to “wrap”
the re-encryption result and the previous level (re-encrypted)
ciphertext, so that these elements cannot be reused by the
adversary in the next round re-encryption.
We now start describing our new CCA-secure AMH-
IBCPRE scheme. We allow condition and identities to be
arbitrary length, but they should be hashed by a TCR hash
function H0 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q beforehand.
1) Setup(1k). Given k, run (q, g, ĝ,G1,G2,GT , e) ←
BSetup(1k). Let w ∈ Z∗q be a condition. Choose α, β,
γ, δ1, δ2, δ3, η ∈R Z∗q , and set g1 = gα, g2 = gβ ,
h = gγ , f1 = gδ1 , f2 = gδ2 , f3 = gδ3 , t = gη , ĝ1 = ĝα,
ĝ2 = ĝ
β , ĥ = ĝγ , f̂1 = ĝδ1 , f̂2 = ĝδ2 ,f̂3 = ĝδ3 , t̂ = ĝη .
Choose two TCR hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}k → Z∗q ,
H2 : GT → {0, 1}poly(1
k), and a CCA-secure one-
time symmetric key encryption SYM = (SYM.Enc,
SYM.Dec). Let (Sig.KG, Sign, V er) be a sUF one-
time signature scheme and assume any verification key
Kv in Z∗q . The master secret key msk = (ĝ0 =
ĝαβ , f̂1, t̂), the master public key mpk = (q, k, g, ĝ,
G1, G2, GT , e, g1, h, f1, f2, f3, t, ĝ2, f̂2, f̂3, ĥ, H1,
H2, SYM , (Sig.KG, Sign, V er)).
2) Extract(msk, ID). Given msk and an identity ID ∈
Z∗q , choose r,R ∈R Z∗q , output skID = (skID0 , skID1 ,
skID2) = (ĝ0(ĥ
IDf̂1)
r t̂R, ĝr, ĝR). After receiving the
secret key from PKG, the user can check the key as:
e(g, skID0)
?
= e(g1, ĝ2) · e(hIDf1, skID1) · e(t, skID2).
3) Enc(IDi, w,m). Choose s0 ∈R Z∗q and a one-time
signature key pair (Ks,Kv) ← Sig.KG(1k), com-
pute C0 = Kv , C1 = e(g1, ĝ2)s0 · m, C2 = gs0 ,
C3 = (h
IDif1)
s0 , C4 = ts0 , C5 = (hwf2)s0 ,
C6 = (h
Kvf3)
s0 , C7 = Sign(Ks, (C1, C2, C3, C4,
C5, C6)), and output the 1-st level ciphertext C1,IDi,w =
(C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7), where IDi ∈ Z∗q and
m ∈ GT .
4) ReKeyGen(IDi, skIDi , IDi′ , w). Choose θ
(l)
1 ∈R
GT , ρ(l), s(l)1 , r̄
(l)
1 ∈R Z∗q and a one-time signa-
ture key pair (K(l)s ,K
(l)
v ) ← Sig.KG(1k), com-
pute rkw,IDi→IDi′ : rk
(l)
0 = (skIDi0 (ĥ
wf̂2)
ρ(l))H1(θ
(l)
1 ),
rk
(l)
1 = (ĝ
ρ(l))H1(θ
(l)
1 ), rk(l)2 = sk
H1(θ
(l)
1 )
IDi1
, rk(l)3 =
sk
H1(θ
(l)
1 )
IDi2
, rk(l)4 = e(g1, ĝ2)
s
(l)
1 · θ(l)1 , rk
(l)
5 = g
s
(l)
1 ,
rk
(l)
6 = (h
IDi′ f1)
s
(l)
1 , rk(l)7 = t
s
(l)
1 , rk(l)8 = (h
wf2)
s
(l)
1 ,
rk
(l)
9 = (h
K(l)v f3)
s
(l)
1 , rk(l)10 = K
(l)
v , rk
(l)
11 = Sign(K
(l)
s ,
(rk
(l)
4 , rk
(l)
5 , rk
(l)
6 , rk
(l)
7 , rk
(l)
8 , rk
(l)
9 )), rk
(l)
12 =
(hIDi′ f1)
r̄
(l)
1 , rk(l)13 = g
r̄
(l)
1 , rk(l)14 = t
r̄
(l)
1 , rk15 = hr̄
(l)
1 ,
rk
(l)
16 = e(g1, ĝ2)
r̄
(l)
1 , rk(l)17 = f
r̄
(l)
1
2 , rk
(l)
18 = f
r̄
(l)
1
3 , where
IDi, IDi′ ∈ Z∗q and l ∈ {1, ..., poly(1k)}.
5) ReEnc(rkw,IDi→IDi′ , w, Cl,IDi,w).
(1) If l = 1,
i. Verify
e(ĥKv f̂3, C2)
?
= e(ĝ, C6),
e(ĥwf̂2, C2)
?
= e(ĝ, C5),
V er(Kv, C7, (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6))
?
= 1.
(1)
If Eq. (1) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise,
proceed.
ii. Choose θ(1)2 ∈R GT , s
(1)
2 ∈R Z∗q and a one-time
signature key pair (K̄(1)s , K̄
(1)
v )← Sig.KG(1k),
compute C(1)7 =
e(C2,rk
(1)
0 )/e(C5,rk
(1)
1 )
e(C3,rk
(1)
2 )·e(C4,rk
(1)
3 )
, σ(1) =
SYM.Enc(C0||C1||....||C7||C(1)7 , H2(θ
(1)
2 )),
C
(1)
8 = rk
s
(1)
2
16 · θ
(1)
2 , C
(1)
9 = rk
(1)s
(1)
2
13 ,
C
(1)
10 = rk
(1)s
(1)
2
12 , C
(1)
11 = rk
(1)s
(1)
2
14 , C
(1)
12 =
(rk
(1)w
15 rk
(1)
17 )
s
(1)
2 , C(1)13 = (rk
(1)K̄(1)v
15 rk
(1)
18 )
s
(1)
2 ,
C
(1)
14 = K̄
(1)
v , C
(1)
15 = Sign(K̄
(1)
s , (C
(1)
8 ,
C
(1)
9 , C
(1)
10 , C
(1)
11 , C
(1)
12 , C
(1)
13 )). Output
C2,IDi′ ,w = (σ
(1), C(1)8 , C
(1)
9 , C
(1)
10 , C
(1)
11 ,
C
(1)
12 , C
(1)
13 , C
(1)
14 , C
(1)
15 , rk
(1)
4 , rk
(1)
5 , rk
(1)
6 ,
rk
(1)
7 , rk
(1)
8 , rk
(1)
9 , rk
(1)
10 , rk
(1)
11 ).
(2) If l ≥ 2,
i. Verify
e(rk
(l−1)
5 , ĥ
wf̂2)
?
= e(rk
(l−1)
8 , ĝ),
e(rk
(l−1)
5 , ĥ
K(l−1)v f̂3)
?
= e(rk
(l−1)
9 , ĝ),
V er(rk
(l−1)
10 , rk
(l−1)
11 , (rk
(l−1)
4 , rk
(l−1)
5 ,
rk
(l−1)
6 , rk
(l−1)
7 , rk
(l−1)
8 , rk
(l−1)
9 ))
?
= 1. (2)
e(C
(l−1)
9 , ĥ
wf̂2)
?
= e(C
(l−1)
12 , ĝ),
e(C
(l−1)
9 , ĥ
K̄v
(l−1)
f̂3)
?
= e(C
(l−1)
13 , ĝ),
V er(C
(l−1)
14 , C
(l−1)
15 , (C
(l−1)
8 , C
(l−1)
9 , C
(l−1)
10 ,
C
(l−1)
11 , C
(l−1)
12 , C
(l−1)
13 ))
?
= 1. (3)
If Eq. (2) and (3) do not hold, output ⊥. Other-
wise, proceed.
ii. Choose θ(l)2 ∈R GT , s
(l)
2 ∈R Z∗p and
(K̄
(l)
s , K̄
(l)
v ) ← Sig.KG(1k), and then
compute C(l)7,0 =
e(rk
(l−1)
5 ,rk
(l)
0 )/e(rk
(l−1)
8 ,rk
(l)
1 )
e(rk
(l−1)
6 ,rk
(l)
2 )·e(rk
(l−1)
7 ,rk
(l)
3 )
,
C
(l)
7,1 =
e(C
(l−1)
9 ,rk
(l)
0 )/e(C
(l−1)
12 ,rk
(l)
1 )
e(C
(l−1)
10 ,rk
(l)
2 )·e(C
(l−1)
11 ,rk
(l)
3 )
, σ(l) =
SYM.Enc(σ(l−1)||C(l−1)8 ||....||C
(l−1)
15 ||rk
(l−1)
4 ||
...||rk(l−1)11 ||C
(l−1)
7,0 ||C
(l−1)
7,1 , H2(θ
(l)
2 )), C
(l)
8 =
rk
(l)s
(l)
2
16 · θ
(l)
2 , C
(l)
9 = rk
(l)s
(l)
2
13 , C
(l)
10 = rk
(l)s
(l)
2
12 ,
C
(l)
11 = rk
(l)s
(l)
2
14 , C
(l)
12 = (rk
(l)w
15 rk
(l)
17 )
s
(l)
2 ,
C
(l)
13 = (rk
(l)K̄(l)v
15 rk
(l)
18 )
s
(l)
2 , C(l)14 = K̄
(l)
v ,
C
(l)
15 = Sign(K̄
(l)
s , (C
(l)
8 , C
(l)
9 , C
(l)
10 , C
(l)
11 , C
(l)
12 ,
9
C
(l)
13 )). Output Cl,IDi′ ,w = (σ
(l), C(l)8 , C
(l)
9 ,
C
(l)
10 , C
(l)
11 , C
(l)
12 , C
(l)
13 , C
(l)
14 , C
(l)
15 , rk
(l)
4 , rk
(l)
5 ,
rk
(l)
6 , rk
(l)
7 , rk
(l)
8 , rk
(l)
9 , rk
(l)
10 , rk
(l)
11 ).
6) Dec(skIDi , w, Cl,IDi,w).
(1) If l = 1,
i. Verify Eq. (1). If Eq. (1) does not hold, output
⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
ii. Compute
C1/
e(C2, skID0)
e(C3, skID1) · e(C4, skID2)
= e(g1, ĝ2)
s0 ·m/ e(g
s0 , ĝ0(ĥ
IDi f̂)r t̂R)
e((hIDif)s0 , ĝr) · e(ts0 , ĝR)
= e(g1, ĝ2)
s0 ·m/e(g1, ĝ2)s0 = m.
(2) If l ≥ 2,
i. Verify
e(rk
(l)
5 , ĥ
wf̂2)
?
= e(rk
(l)
8 , ĝ),
e(rk
(l)
5 , ĥ
K(l)v f̂3)
?
= e(rk
(l)
9 , ĝ),
V er(rk
(l)
10 , rk
(l)
11 , (rk
(l)
4 , rk
(l)
5 , rk
(l)
6 , rk
(l)
7 , rk
(l)
8 ,
rk
(l)
9 ))
?
= 1. (4)
e(C
(l)
9 , ĥ
wf̂2)
?
= e(C
(l)
12 , ĝ),
e(C
(l)
9 , ĥ
K̄(l)v f̂3)
?
= e(C
(l)
13 , ĝ),
V er(C
(l)
14 , C
(l)
15 , (C
(l)
8 , C
(l)
9 , C
(l)
10 , C
(l)
11 , C
(l)
12 ,
C
(l)
13 ))
?
= 1. (5)
If Eq. (4) and (5) do not hold, output ⊥. Other-
wise, proceed.
ii. Compute
e(rk
(l)
5 , skIDi′0
)
e(rk
(l)
6 , skIDi′1
) · e(rk(l)7 , skIDi′2 )
=
e(gs
(l)
1 , ĝ0(ĥ
IDi′ f̂1)
r t̂R)
e((hIDi′ f1)s
(l)
1 , ĝr) · e(ts
(l)
1 , ĝR)
= e(g1, ĝ2)
s
(l)
1 ,
and
e(C
(l)
9 , skIDi′0
)
e(C
(l)
10 , skIDi′1
) · e(C(l)11 , skIDi′2 )
=
e(gs̄
(l)
2 , ĝ0(ĥ
IDi′ f̂1)
r t̂R)
e((hIDi′ f1)s̄
(l)
2 , ĝr) · e(ts̄
(l)
2 , ĝR)
= e(g1, ĝ2)
s̄
(l)
2 ,
where s̄(l)2 = s
(l)
2 · r̄
(l)
1 .
iii. Compute two values θ(l)1 = rk
(l)
4 /e(g1, ĝ2)
s
(l)
1 ,
and θ(l)2 = C
(l)
8 /e(g1, ĝ2)
s̄
(l)
2 . Recover
σ(l−1)||C(l−1)8 ||....||C
(l−1)
15 ||rk
(l−1)
4 ||...||rk
(l−1)
11 ||
C
(l−1)
7,0 ||C
(l−1)
7,1 = SYM.Dec(σ
(l), H2(θ
(l)
2 )).
iv. Compute
C
(l−1)(H1(θ(l)1 ))
−1
7,0
= (e(g1, ĝ2)
s
(l−1)
1 )(H1(θ
(l)
1 ))(H1(θ
(l)
1 ))
−1
= e(g1, ĝ2)
s
(l−1)
1 ,
and θ(l−1)1 = rk
(l−1)
4 /e(g1, ĝ2)
s
(l−1)
1 if E.q (2)
holds.
v. Compute
C
(l)(H1(θ
(l)
1 ))
−1
7,1
= (e(g1, ĝ2)
s̄
(l−1)
2 )(H1(θ
(l)
1 ))(H1(θ
(l)
1 ))
−1
= e(g1, ĝ2)
s̄
(l−1)
2 ,
and θ(l−1)2 = C
(l−1)
8 /e(g1, ĝ2)
s̄
(l−1)
2 if E.q (3)
holds.
vi. For 1 ≤ j ≤ l− 2, from l− 2 to 1, compute θ(j)1
and θ(j)2 as in the previous steps.
vii. Recover
C0||C1||....||C7||C(1)7 = SYM.Dec(σ(1), H2(θ
(1)
2 )).
Compute
C1/C
(1)(H1(θ
(1)
1 ))
−1
7
= e(g1, ĝ2)
s0 ·m/e(g1, ĝ2)s0H1(θ
(1)
1 )(H1(θ
(1)
1 ))
−1
= m,
if Eq. (1) holds.
Convert to be single-hop. It is not difficult to convert
the current construction to become a single-hop system by
eliminating the respective ciphertext and re-encryption key
components C(l)12 and rk
(l)
8 in the algorithms ReEnc and
ReKeyGen, where l = 1. Without these necessary compo-
nents, the resulting re-encrypted ciphertext cannot be further
converted.
Support multi-condition. The system can be extended to
support multi-condition for re-encryption control. We will
concatenate all conditions together, and put the resulting
concatenation into a TCR hash function H0, and further regard
the hash value as a keyword exponent w.
Theorem 4: Our AMH-IBCPRE scheme is IND-sCon-sID-
CCA secure assuming the decisional P-BDH assumption
holds, (Sig.KG, Sign, V er) is a sUF one-time signature
scheme, SYM is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key
encryption and H1, H2 are TCR hash functions.
Please refer to Appendix A for the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5: Our AMH-IBCPRE scheme is selective collu-
sion resistant.
Please refer to Appendix B for the proof of Theorem 5.
Theorem 6: Our AMH-IBCPRE scheme achieves ANO-
OC assuming the decisional P-BDH assumption holds,
(Sig.KG, Sign, V er) is a sUF one-time signature scheme,
SYM is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key encryption
and H1, H2 are TCR hash functions.
Please refer to Appendix C for the proof of Theorem 6.
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Theorem 7: Our AMH-IBCPRE scheme achieves ANO-
RK assuming the decisional P-BDH assumption holds,
(Sig.KG, Sign, V er) is a sUF one-time signature scheme,
SYM is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key encryption
and H1, H2 are TCR hash functions.
Please refer to Appendix D for the proof of Theorem 7.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced a novel notion, anonymous multi-hop
identity-based conditional proxy re-encryption, to preserve
the anonymity for ciphertext sender/receiver, conditional data
sharing and multiple recipient-update. We further proposed a
concrete system for the notion. Meanwhile, we proved the
system CCA-secure in the standard model under the decisional
P -bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. To the best of our
knowledge, our primitive is the first of its kind in the literature.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: Suppose there is an adversary A who can break
the IND-sCon-sID-CCA security of our scheme. We then
construct a reduction algorithm B to break the CCA security
of 3-level Du-ANO-HIBE. Let B1 be the challenger of the
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3-level Du-ANO-HIBE in the CCA experiment. B maintains
the following tables which are initially empty.
1) DCT : records the tuples (w|IDi, ..., IDj , tag), which
are the delegation chains under condition w from IDi to
IDj , where tag denotes that the chain is either uncor-
rupted (“1”) or corrupted (“0”), i, j ∈ {1, ..., poly(1k)}.
2) SKT : records the tuples (IDi, skIDi), which are the in-
formation of the secret keys (obtained in the simulation).
3) RKT : records the tuples (IDi, IDi′ , w, rkw,IDi→IDi′ ,
θ1), which are the results of the queries to
Ork(IDi, IDi′ , w), where tag denotes that the re-
encryption key is either a valid key (“1”) or a random
key (“0”).
4) RET : records the tuples (IDi, IDi′ , w, C(l+1,IDi′ ,w),
tag), which are the results of the queries to Ore(IDi,
IDi′ , w, C(l,IDi,w)), where tag denotes that the re-
encrypted ciphertext is generated under a valid re-
encryption key (“1”), a random key (“0”) or generated
without using any re-encryption key (“⊥”).
1) Init. A outputs ID∗ and w∗ to B, B then forwards them
as well as a self-chosen K∗v
2 to B1.
2) Setup. B1 sends mpk = (g, ĝ, g1, h, f1, f2, f3, t, ĝ2, f̂2,
f̂3, ĥ, (Sig.KG, Sign, V er)) to B. Then B chooses two
TCR hash function H1, H2 and a CCA-secure one-time
symmetric key encryption SYM as in the real scheme,
adds them to mpk and forwards the resulting mpk to A.
3) Phase 1. A issues a series of queries.
a) Osk(ID): if there is a tuple (ID, skID) in SKT , B
returns skID to A. Otherwise, B works as follows.
• If ID∗ = ID or ID is in (w∗|ID∗, ..., 1) ∈ DCT
holds, B outputs ⊥.
• Otherwise, B forwards the query to the secret key ex-
traction oracle of 3-level Du-ANO-HIBE, Oextract,
obtains the secret key and forwards the key to A.
Finally, B adds (ID, skID) to SKT .
b) Ork(IDi, IDi′ , w): if there is a tuple (IDi,
IDi′ , w, rkw,IDi→IDi′ , θ
(l)
1 , ∗) in RKT , B returns
rkw,IDi→IDi′ to A. Otherwise, B works as follows.
• If (ID∗ = IDi or IDi in (w∗|ID∗, ..., 1) ∈
DCT ) ∧ IDi′ in (w∗|∗, ..., 0) ∈ DCT hold, then
B outputs ⊥, where w∗ = w.
• If ID∗ = IDi ∧ IDi′ in (w∗|∗, ..., 1) ∈ DCT hold,
B sets rk(l)0 = σ1, rk
(l)
1 = σ2, rk
(l)
2 = σ3, rk
(l)
3 =
σ4, and constructs the rest of components as in the
real scheme, where σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4 ∈R G2, w∗ = w.
B sends the re-encryption key to A, and adds (IDi,
IDj , w, rkw,IDi→IDi′ , θ
(l)
1 , 0) to RKT .
• If ID∗ = IDi ∧ w∗ 6= w hold, B sends
ID = (ID∗, w) to Oextract, and obtains skID
which are identical to rk(l)H1(θ
(l)
1 )
−1
0 , rk
(l)H1(θ
(l)
1 )
−1
1 ,
rk
(l)H1(θ
(l)
1 )
−1
2 and rk
(l)H1(θ
(l)
1 )
−1
3 . B then generates
the rest of components of the re-encryption key
as in the real scheme, and adds (IDi, IDj , w,
rkw,IDi→IDi′ , θ
(l)
1 , 1) to RKT .
2Note this verification key will not be used in the query phases but in the
challenge phase.
• Otherwise, B queries IDi to Oextract to ob-
tain the secret key skIDi , next generates the re-
encryption key as in the real scheme and responds
the key to A, and finally adds (IDi, skIDi) and
(IDi, IDi′ , w, rkw,IDi→IDi′ , θ
(l)
1 , 1) to SKT and
RKT , respectively, where θ(l)1 ∈R GT . Note if
(IDi, skIDi) is in SKT , B uses skIDi to generate
the re-encryption key as in the real scheme.
c) Ore(IDi, IDi′ , w, Cl,IDi,w):
• If the first case of step b) does not hold, B can first
construct the re-encryption key as in step b) and
then generate the re-encrypted ciphertext using the
re-encryption key. Finally, B responds the ciphertext
to A and adds (IDi, IDj , w, rkw,IDi→IDi′ , θ
(l)
1 , ∗)
and (IDi, IDi′ , w, C(l+1,IDi′ ,w), ∗) to RKT and
RET , respectively.
• Otherwise
i) If l = 1, B first verifies whether Eq. (1)
holds. If not B outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B queries
((IDi, w,Kv), C1,IDi,w)) to the decryption or-
acle of 3-level Du-ANO-HIBE, denoted as
Odecrypt, and obtains the underlying message.
With knowledge of the message, B can re-
cover the hiding factor K0 = e(g1, ĝ2)s0 . B
further calculates C(1)7 = K
H1(θ
(1)
1 )
0 , constructs
symmetric encryption σ(1) with θ(1)2 , generates
the ciphertext C(1)8 , ..., C
(1)
15 under IDi′ to hide
θ
(1)
2 and the ciphertext rk
(1)
4 , ..., rk
(1)
11 under
IDi′ to hide θ
(1)
1 as in the real scheme, where
θ
(1)
1 , θ
(1)
2 ∈R GT . Finally, B responds the re-
encrypted ciphertext to A and adds (IDi, IDi′ ,
w, C(2,IDi′ ,w), ⊥) to RET .
ii) If l ≥ 2, B first verifies whether Eq. (2) and
Eq. (3) hold. If not B outputs ⊥. Otherwise,
B constructs the corresponding re-encrypted ci-
phertext in the identical method as above except
that C(l)7,0, C
(l)
7,1 should be generated like the way
of generating C(1)7 .
Note the queries issued by A should follow the
restrictions defined in Definition 2.
d) Odec(IDi, w, Cl,IDi,w): if Cl,IDi,w is a derivative of
the challenge ciphertext, B outputs ⊥. Since B can
access to the decryption oracle Odecrypt, then it can
easily tell any derivative.
• If l = 1, that is, C1,IDi,w is the first level ciphertext
without any re-encryption. B first verifies whether
Eq. (1) holds. If not, B outputs ⊥ and proceeds
otherwise.
i) If (IDi, skIDi) ∈ SKT , then B recovers m
using skIDi as in the real scheme.
ii) Otherwise, B queries ((IDi, w, Kv), C1,IDi,w))
to Odecrypt, and returns m.
• If l ≥ 2, that is, Cl,IDi,w is the re-encrypted cipher-
text. B first verifies whether Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) hold.
If not, B outputs ⊥ and proceeds otherwise.
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i) If w∗ = w and ID∗ = IDi, B issues ID =
(ID∗, w∗, K̄
(l)
v ) to Oextract, and obtains skID.
B then recovers θ(l)1 , θ
(l)
2 as in the algorithm Dec
of 3-level Du-ANO-HIBE, and further recovers
m as in the real scheme.
ii) Else, B forwards (rk(l)4 , ..., rk
(l)
11 ) and
(C
(l)
8 , ..., C
(l)
15 ) to Odecrypt and then obtains
θ
(l)
1 , θ
(l)
2 . B uses θ
(l)
1 and θ
(l)
2 to recover θ
(i)
1 , θ
(i)
2
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1 from l − 1 to 1. Next, B
recovers (C0, ..., C7) by using θ
(1)
2 , computes
K0 with θ
(1)
1 , and finally recovers m as in the
real scheme.
Note B can recover θ(i)1 , θ
(i)
2 on its own if
(IDi, skIDi) ∈ SKT for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ l .
4) Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it
outputs m0,m1 and {IDij}
j=l∗−1
1 to B. B first gen-
erates the ciphertext Cl∗−1,IDil∗−1 ,w∗ for mb as in the
real scheme, where all re-encryption keys and the first
level ciphertext C1,IDi1 ,w∗ can be easily constructed
with knowledge of skIDij (which can be obtained
from Oextract), and b ∈ {0, 1}. B further chooses
(θ
(l∗)
1,0 , θ
(l∗)
1,1 ), (θ
(l∗)
2,0 , θ
(l∗)
2,1 ) ∈R GT , and forwards them to
B1. B1 returns rk(l
∗)
4 , ...., rk
(l∗)
11 and C
(l∗)
8 , ...., C
(l∗)
15
for θ(l
∗)
1,b̂
and θ(l
∗)
2,b̄
, respectively, where b̂, b̄ ∈ {0, 1}. B
then generates the re-encryption key rkw∗,IDil∗−1→ID∗
components rk(l
∗)
0 , rk
(l∗)
1 , rk
(l∗)
2 , rk
(l∗)
3 (with θ
(l∗)
1,b̂
), and
C
(l∗)
7,0 , C
(l∗)
7,1 , σ
(l∗) (with θ(l
∗)
2,b̂
) as in the real scheme. B
finally returns Cl∗,ID∗,w∗ to A.
5) Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1.
6) Guess. B outputs whatever A outputs.
In the above simulations, A’s view is identical to the
real attack except for the case that B responds the random
re-encryption keys in step (b) to A. It is clear that the
components (of the random re-encryption key) σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4
can take the form of rk(l)0 , rk
(l)
1 , rk
(l)
2 , rk
(l)
3 (of the real re-
encryption key), respectively. Besides, rk(l)12 , ..., rk
(l)
18 of the
random re-encryption key are identical to those of the real one.
Hence, the problem is equivalent to the distinguishability of
the encryption of a random θ(l)1 (of the random re-encryption
key) and the encryption of the θ(l)1 (of the real re-encryption
key). If there is an adversary A1 who can distinguish the
encryptions above, we can construct an algorithm B2 to break
the decisional P-BDH problem in (G1,G2) by using A1.
B chooses a challenge verification key K∗v beforehand,
and this verification key cannot be used in the simulations.
Therefore, B’s advantage is at least ε(qrk+qre+qdec)4q , and the
running time of B is O(time(A)), where qrk, qre, qdec are the
total numbers of re-encryption key extraction, re-encryption
and decryption queries, respectively.
B. Proof of Theorem 5
Below we prove that the IND-sCon-sID-CCA security of
our scheme already implies the selective collusion resistance.
Proof: In the game of Definition 2, an adversary A is
allowed to gain access to the re-encryption keys rkw,ID∗→IDi′
and rkw,IDi′→IDi′′ , where w is not the challenge condition,
IDi′ is honest and IDi′′ is corrupted by A. Suppose our
AMH-IBCPRE system is not collusion resistant, A can com-
promise the secret key skIDi′ with knowledge of skIDi′′ and
rkw,IDi′→IDi′′ . A further compromise skID∗ with knowledge
of skIDi′ and rkw,ID∗→IDi′ . Given the challenge ciphertext
Cl∗,ID∗,w∗ , the adversary A can easily retrieve the value of
the bit b by using skID∗ . The IND-sCon-sID-CCA security
fails here that contradicts our security notion. Therefore, the
IND-sCon-sID-CCA security implies collusion resistance.
C. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof: Suppose there is an adversary A who can break
the ANO-OC security of our scheme, then we can construct
an algorithm B to solve the decisional P-BDH problem in
(G1,G2) by using A.
• Init. Same as the proof of Theorem 4 except the follow-
ings. A outputs ID∗0 and ID∗1 to B, and B forwards ID∗b
to B1, where b ∈ {0, 1}.
• Setup. Same as the proof of Theorem 4.
• Phase 1. Same as the proof of Theorem 4.
• Challenge. When A decides that Phase 2 is over, then
it outputs m to B. B chooses a random message m′ fro
message space, and sets m1 = m, m0 = m′. B next
forwards m0,m1 to B1, obtains the ciphertext C1,ID∗b ,w∗
for mb̄ from B1, where b̄ ∈ {0, 1}. Then B forwards
C1,ID∗b ,w∗ to A.
• Phase 2. Same as Phase 1.
• Guess. B outputs whatever A outputs.
The probability analysis is the same as that of The-
orem 4. Therefore, the advantage of B is at least
AdvANO-OCA (1k)(qrk+qre+qdec)
2q , and the running time of B is
O(time(A)).
D. Proof of Theorem 7
Proof: Supposing there is an adversary A who can
break the ANO-RK security of our scheme, we can construct
an algorithm B to solve the decisional P-BDH problem in
(G1,G2) by using A.
• Init. Same as the proof of Theorem 4 except that A
outputs ID′, ID∗ to B, and B next forwards ID∗ to B1.
• Setup. Same as the proof of Theorem 4.
• Phase 1. A is allowed to issue queries to the oracles
Osk, Ork, Ore, Odec as in the Phase 1 of the proof of
Theorem 4.
• Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, B
flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0, B sets rk(l)0 =
σ
H1(θ
(l)
1,b̂
)
1 , rk
(l)
1 = σ
H1(θ
(l)
1,b̂
)
2 , rk
(l)
2 = σ
H1(θ
(l)
1,b̂
)
3 , rk
(l)
3 =
σ
H1(θ
(l)
1,b̂
)
4 , and issues θ
(l)
1,0, θ
(l)
1,1 ∈R GT to B1, where
σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4 ∈R G2 and b̂ ∈ {0, 1}. B1 returns rk(l)4 , ...,
rk
(l)
11 for θ
(l)
1,b̂
. B next constructs the rest of re-encryption
key’s components (i.e. rk(l)12 , ..., rk
(l)
18 ) as in the real
scheme. That is, such a re-encryption key is a random key
from the re-encryption key space. Otherwise, B constructs
13
the re-encryption key rkw∗,ID′→ID∗ as above except
that rk(l)0 , rk
(l)
1 , rk
(l)
2 , rk
(l)
3 are constructed as in the real
scheme with knowledge skID′ which can be obtained
from Oextract. Finally, B responds rkw∗,ID′→ID∗ to A.
• Phase 2. Same as Phase 1.
• Guess. B outputs whatever A outputs.
Similar to the analysis in the proof of Theorem 6, B’s
advantage is at least Adv
ANO-RK
A (1
k)(qrk+qre+qdec)
2q , and the
running time of B is O(time(A)).
